TEL AVIV — In early April, Benjamin Netanyahu won an election that was supposed to send him to an unprecedented 11th consecutive year as Israel’s prime minister. There was only one small obstacle in his way: forming a government.
The day after the election I predicted that “the coalition that he forms will probably have little more than the minimum 61 seats behind it.” I was wrong by one. Mr. Netanyahu was able to bring together 60 seats out of the Knesset’s 120 — and not a single one more.
At midnight on Wednesday, his deadline to form a government expired. He has only one, costly option now: sending Israeli voters back to the polls and starting over. It looks as if we’ll be voting again in mid-September.
How did this happen?
To really understand it, you have to go back many decades.
In Israel, all citizens are supposed to serve in the military or perform another type of national service. But one group has been relieved of this duty since the state was established: the ultra-Orthodox, known here as Haredim, who make up about 10 percent of the population. Thanks to their high birthrate, the Haredim double in number every 10 to 15 years. When deferment began in 1948 there were about 400 Haredim eligible for it. Today there are more than 50,000. According to Israel’s bureau of statistics, as much as a third of Israel’s population will be Haredi by 2065.
Young Haredi men study the Torah instead of wearing a uniform. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a vast majority of Israelis believe this is unfair.
The Supreme Court doesn’t like the arrangement either. In 2017, the court declared it unconstitutional and demanded new legislation that could withstand judicial review. Since then, the court agreed to grant the government a few postponements, but now the deadline is near. The new government, when formed, must pass a new law to continue the Haredim’s national service exemption. If it fails to do so, the court could decide that the arrangement is void, and prompt a political and social crisis by in essence ordering the state to draft many thousands of reluctant, disobedient, Haredim.
And here’s the problem. The political parties representing the ultra-Orthodox in the Knesset (currently, with 16 seats) have a lot of clout because they have been crucial in propping up coalitions like Mr. Netanyahu’s. In return for their support, the governments — in recent decades most of them have been right-wing — have put aside the issue of Haredi military service. That was the plan, once again, for the next Knesset.
Then one person decided to ruin the plan. Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, represents mostly voters of Russian and Eastern European origin. His voters, like him, are on the right. They are also secular and don’t have much love for the ultra-Orthodox parties and their political power to institute religiously coercive policies.
For years, Yisrael Beiteinu and the Haredi parties were in an uneasy alliance, along with the Likud party. No longer. During the last few weeks of negotiation over forming the new government, Mr. Lieberman has decided to insist on passing a version of a bill on military service that the Haredi parties oppose.
Mr. Lieberman is known to be cunning, so many Israelis suspect that his real motivations are hidden — maybe a personal vendetta against Mr. Netanyahu or a cynical ploy to gain more seats in the Knesset in a new election. But sometimes it is useful to take politicians at face value: Mr. Lieberman, who was defense minister when that bill was written, is committed to passing it and sees no reason make it acceptable to Haredi parties.
But why he is doing this now, rather than during the last government, may have to do with larger changes to Israel’s political landscape, in particular the opportunity to redraw the map of political rivalries.
For many years, the left has been the usual punching bag for right-wing politicians who wanted to galvanize their base. The truth is that leftists, known in Hebrew as smolanim, are disliked by most of the Israeli public. They are associated with a failed peace process, with weaker security policies, with naïveté. In Israeli politics, “smolani” is often synonymous with untrustworthy and unpatriotic.
That trick is getting old. The Israeli left is defeated and marginalized. The public long ago moved rightward. The last election was predominantly fought between Likud and an upstart center-center-right party called Blue and White. The old parties of the left collectively took only 10 seats. Yes, “smolani” is still hurled as an insult at potential rivals, but with less passion. The right dislikes leftists — but there is not much left to dislike.
Maybe this is why Mr. Lieberman has decided to shift gears and go after the Haredi parties.
In fact, the Haredim are even more disliked than leftists: According to polling from the Jewish People Policy Institute, where I work, just 20 percent of Jewish Israelis say that they make a “very positive contribution” to Israel, while almost half say their contribution to Israel is “negative.”
Haredim are disliked not only because they don’t serve in the military and because their politicians hold the government coalition hostage, but also because their participation in the work force is low and they pay less in taxes than other communities. And, of course, because they are different. They wear black hats and live in segregated neighborhoods, and seem radical, outdated and sometimes just plain weird.
Speaking on Tuesday, Mr. Lieberman said: “I am not against the ultra-Orthodox public. I am for the State of Israel.” He added, “I am for a Jewish state but against a religiously coercive state.” As he tries to convince voters that he has stymied coalition talks out of principle, not self-interest, he is now bringing up other issues that relate to the ultra-Orthodox beyond military service: closing stores on the Sabbath, Haredi boycotts of factories that operate on the Sabbath and the rabbinical use of DNA tests to verify the Jewishness of Russian immigrants, and more. These are precisely the policy areas where the Haredim have exercised their political power — and where they are unpopular with much of the public.
By sabotaging a right-Haredi coalition and prompting a new election, Mr. Lieberman is presenting voters on the right with a question: Whom do they dislike more, the smolanim or the Haredim? Mr. Netanyahu’s bet is on the old fight, against the left; Mr. Lieberman decided to bet on a political fight against the ultra-Orthodox.
He might be on to something. There’s no reason for Israelis to worry about the left anymore. But there is good reason to be concerned about how the ultra-Orthodox can misuse their power. The time has come for someone with political clout to make that point and to try to rein in the ultra-Orthodox pull on Israeli public life and politics. It remains to be seen if it’s a winning political strategy.
Shmuel Rosner is the political editor at The Jewish Journal, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute and a contributing opinion writer. @rosnersdomain
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/opinion/israel-election-coalition-lieberman.html
2019-05-30 08:15:26Z
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