HONG KONG: Hong Kong health authorities have defended the practice of physically restraining some babies and children to beds in COVID-19 isolation wards after criticism built over the treatment of families under the city's strict anti-virus measures.
Despite being one of the most densely packed cities in the world, Hong Kong has kept infections low thanks to some of the most stringent quarantine measures in the world, recording about 11,000 infections and 200 deaths since the pandemic began.
Anyone who tests positive for the coronavirus is immediately taken to isolation wards - regardless of whether they are symptomatic or not - and those deemed "close contacts" are sent to mandatory government quarantine camps.
Almost all arrivals into the city must also quarantine in dedicated hotels for three weeks.
The measures have helped curb infections and have been in place for much of the past year, largely without complaint.
But there has been growing pushback in recent weeks after an outbreak hit neighbourhoods favoured by wealthier - and more politically connected - white-collar locals and foreigners.
Social media groups have since filled with comments by families taken to isolation wards or mandatory quarantine camps.
Their complaints include allegations that some parents have been separated from their children, ordered not to breastfeed babies and that some infants have even been tied to beds to stop them moving around.
The allegations have led to a series of statements this week from health authorities defending their policies, including over the use of restraints.
"Generally speaking, the hospital will only consider the application of physical restraint on paediatric patients for the safety and well-being of the patient," the Hospital Authority said in a statement late on Wednesday (Mar 17).
"Appropriate and prior consent will be sought from the parents or guardians," it added.
The Hospital Authority added parents who test negative would usually be allowed to accompany infected children on isolation wards if there is space.
In recent days, the consulates of Switzerland, Britain and the United States have all expressed concerns over how Hong Kong's tough anti-virus measures were impacting families, including concerns that parents had about being separated from children.
The US consulate temporarily closed earlier this week after two staff members tested positive and were sent to an isolation ward.
Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam confirmed special permission had been granted to allow their children to join them instead of being sent into quarantine.
Hong Kong's treatment of mothers during the pandemic has previously come under scrutiny.
Last year, a group of expecting parents fought an ultimately successful campaign to allow birth partners into the delivery room after they were banned during a spike in coronavirus cases.
World Health Organization guidelines recommend birth partners be present, even during the pandemic, and that infected mothers continue breastfeeding their babies.
While authorities relented on birth partners, Hong Kong continues to tell mothers not to breastfeed in isolation wards.
Authorities have also defended the use of mandatory quarantine camps, arguing most of Hong Kong's notoriously cramped apartments are too small for families to self-isolate safely.
WASHINGTON - The United States sanctioned an additional two dozen Chinese and Hong Kong officials on Tuesday (March 16) over China’s overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral system.
This comes as American and Chinese envoys were due to meet in Alaska for first talks since President Joe Biden took office.
Beijing’s move unilaterally undermines Hong Kong’s electoral system and is in breach of its obligations to uphold the territory’s autonomy, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement announcing the punitive action.
The electoral reforms were approved at a meeting of China’s top legislature last Thursday and are the latest in Beijing’s crackdown on political freedoms and dissent in Hong Kong following the citywide democracy protests of 2019 that turned violent.
“This action further undermines the high degree of autonomy promised to people in Hong Kong and denies Hong Kongers a voice in their own governance, a move that the United Kingdom has declared to be a breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration,” said Mr Blinken.
Under America’s Hong Kong Autonomy Act, the State Department is required to identify individuals responsible for eroding the city’s political freedoms.
Tuesday’s update brings the total number of individuals sanctioned for reducing Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy to 34.
They include 14 vice chairs of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and officials in the Hong Kong Police Force’s National Security Division, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, and the Office for Safeguarding National Security.
Foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant transactions with them are subject to sanctions.
“The United States stands united with our allies and partners in speaking out for the rights and freedoms of people in Hong Kong, and we will respond when the PRC fails to meet its obligations,” said Mr Blinken, using the formal name of the People’s Republic of China.
He and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan are set to meet top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Anchorage, Alaska on Thursday.
The US has said it will raise its concerns at the high-level talks over the following: China’s undermining of Hong Kong autonomy, its repression of Muslims in Xinjiang, economic coercion of Australia and aggressive activity in the Taiwan Strait.
Tuesday’s sanctions come as Mr Blinken and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in South Korea - after a stop in Japan - as part of their first Asia tour to reinvigorate and rally Asian alliances to counter a rising China.
BANGKOK: Chinese factories torched as mainland workers hunker down under martial law – Beijing is being pulled into the ulcerous crisis in Myanmar, an unravelling country it had carefully stitched into its big plans for Asia.
During a January 2020 visit to Myanmar, Chinese President Xi Jinping elevated the Southeast Asian neighbour to "country of shared destiny" status, Beijing's highest diplomatic stripe.
The aim was to nudge Myanmar decisively towards China – and away from the United States – and drive through projects worth billions of dollars under the Belt and Road Initiative, including an oil and gas pipeline and a port to the Indian Ocean.
Fast-forward one year, and the strategically located country has tipped into bloody chaos after a coup took out Aung San Suu Kyi's government.
The massive pro-democracy movement which has since unfurled accuses China of waving through the generals' power grab and trading Myanmar's freedom for its own strategic gain.
As Myanmar security forces kill protesters – nearly 150 so far – Beijing faces a dilemma: Back the men with guns or side with an increasingly anti-China public.
"China doesn't really care who is in government, but it wants a government that will protect Chinese projects and interests," said Richard Horsey, a Myanmar political analyst.
But "this is a military that Beijing doesn't think can bring stability ... and the more China tries to build a relationship with that regime, the more the public will be put offside".
Chinese businesses were closed on Tuesday in the flashpoint areas, leaving workers holed up in a "hostile environment" cloaked by martial law, according to a representative of a garment factory in Yangon's Shwepyitar township.
Analysts say ripples of anti-China sentiment in Myanmar could become waves across a Southeast Asian region suspicious of Beijing's reach. (Photo: AFP/STR)
"All Chinese staff are staying inside the factory ... some police have also been stationed there," the spokesperson told AFP in Beijing, requesting anonymity.
Ominous commentaries have since seeped out of Chinese media with one saying Beijing could be prodded "into taking more drastic action ... if the authorities cannot deliver and the chaos continues".
Twitter accounts of Myanmar pro-democracy groups allege – without offering clear proof – that the army carried out the factory attacks to justify a crackdown which left dozens of protesters dead.
Ripples of anti-China sentiment in Myanmar could become waves across a Southeast Asian region suspicious of China's reach, influence and penchant for debt-trap diplomacy to get Belt and Road Initiative projects over the line.
"Any broad-based popular uprising against Chinese interests can be contagious and percolate anti-China grievances through Cambodia, Laos and elsewhere," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a professor of political science at Thailand's Chulalongkorn University.
"China had figured out this piece (Myanmar) of its geostrategic puzzle," but now there is "no easy play ahead".
Protesters in front of the Chinese embassy in Yangon on Thursday, Feb 11, 2021. (Photo: Naung Kham)
In Myanmar, public anger at Chinese projects has ended major investments before.
Construction of the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam in northern Kachin State was spiked a decade ago after widespread opposition, while the voracious Chinese market for rare wood, jade and rubies is routinely blamed by the public for driving the resource grab inside Myanmar.
But alongside economic interests, China also craves the legitimacy of global leadership and "can't turn a blind eye to a 'dark dictatorship'" on its doorstep, Thitinan added.
Beijing enjoys exceptional leverage over Myanmar, yet has so far refused to label the military action a coup.
It is the country's top foreign investor and supplies the Myanmar army with military hardware.
Observers say it also maintains alliances with ethnic militias on the long China border, who have been fighting the army for decades.
Protesters in front of the Chinese embassy in Yangon on Thursday, Feb 11, 2021. (Photo: Naung Kham)
"BACKBONE OF DISRUPTION"
China has denied any advance knowledge of the Feb 1 coup and its official position so far has been to call for de-escalation while supporting "all sides" in Myanmar's post-coup crisis.
On Mar 11, it signed a United Nations Security Council statement strongly condemning violence against protesters – a rare act by Beijing, which has previously shielded Myanmar at the UN over alleged genocide against the Rohingya.
Still, China remains a potential referee, said Soe Myint Aung, a political analyst from the Yangon Center for Independent Research.
"China can play a direct or indirect mediating role for a negotiated compromise," he said.
But first, it will have to chip back at the anger and suspicion in Myanmar.
Anti-Beijing placards are now common at protests, where rumours of Chinese military flights bounce around, while the Internet grumbles with memes urging a boycott of everything Chinese, from computer games to Huawei phones and TikTok.
"China babysits the Tatmadaw, it is the backbone of disruption in our country," said one pro-democracy supporter in Yangon, requesting anonymity.
"China has dug up our jade and jewels, taken our oil and now it wants to cut our country in half with its pipeline."
NEW DEHLI: Before Myanmar transitioned to a quasi-civilian government in 2011, the military leadership closely studied the model of Indonesia’s democratic transition.
Indonesia had been a fellow ASEAN member state and both sides shared very similar historical experiences.
Forged in the crucible of a struggle for independence, the militaries of both countries had played a decisive role in the creation of their nation-states. They expanded their roles into state administration, civilian life and business conglomerates that provided some semblance of national stability.
Such an exercise could have bright spots. After all, Indonesia’s emergence as a modern democracy, with a flourishing civil society and a well-respected armed forces that enjoys higher levels of trust from the public than even its own president, makes it a model worthy of emulation.
The gradual reduction of its military’s role in politics and transfer of power to a civilian government, despite burgeoning racial tensions and separatist concerns, could be instructive for Myanmar.
But it seems Myanmar left out lessons from this second chapter of Indonesia’s history.
Indeed, Myanmar’s coup to restore order and national unity in the country might have taken heed from Indonesia’s example.
General Suharto’s coup in the 1960s came on the back of a power struggle between opposing, antagonistic forces of the army, who had fought against the Dutch for Indonesia’s independence, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), who attempted to fashion their own militia.
Indonesia, though disparate and diverse, was once united under the banner of driving out the Dutch and embraced a national ethos of Pancasilla (one under God).
Suharto led Indonesia as president from 1967 until his ouster in 1998. (File photo: AFP)
The cracks in the political coalition began showing once the country gained independence. Then President Sukarno had been an influential, charismatic leader but that wasn’t enough to hold the country together.
He eventually proved too weak to keep in check these irreconcilable forces he had brought together under a system of “guided democracy” to support his rule.
The economy was in shambles, while communal strife saw an uptick. Muslims were disillusioned with the Communists overrunning the country and redistributing land away from farmers.
More importantly, a new Cabinet reshuffle threatened to throw out the military generals, including Nasution, then Coordinating Minister for Defence and Security, and diminish their role in politics.
It was in this context that Suharto acted to seize power and introduced a New Order regime.
But Suharto’s 32-year reign found popular support from Indonesians who wanted to see the country strike a different path.
He was committed to achieving political order, economic development, and mass participation in the political process through the military’s territorial command which pervaded the countryside and villages.
Suharto consolidated power through control of the armed forces, Golkar and the People’s Assembly and patronage. But this political stability led to economic development. Growth proceeded, at an average of 7 per cent a year. Schools, roads and telecommunications mushroomed.
And for decades, the Indonesian Armed Forces kept separatist forces on the fringes, in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor.
Tear gas and fire extinguisher gas float around demonstrators as they run away from police during a protest against the military coup in Yangon, Myanmar, on Mar 8, 2021. (Photo: REUTERS/Stringer)
One can see why a coup was an attractive course of action for the Tatmadaw, facing an increasingly popular political adversary in the form of the NLD threatening to water down the military’s influence.
INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
But while the Myanmar military might have been inspired by the embers of Indonesia’s New Order regime, they have failed to absorb the lessons of Indonesia’s democratic transition.
While Suharto’s coup might have ushered in a golden period for the young nation, he knew when to step aside after losing legitimacy. He knew he had lost political support after the 1997 Asian financial crisis unleashed massive economic disruption and racial riots.
Factions of the military no longer thought he had authority, after he failed to take decisive action and sent the Indonesian rupiah into free fall, while a pro-democracy movement gained momentum.
Most importantly, in April 1998, Suharto rejected an offer by military hardliners to declare a state of emergency, choosing instead to transfer power under the constitutional framework of the New Order regime to his vice-president BJ Habibie.
After the civilian political leaders took over, the role of the military's involvement in politics was deliberately reduced. The military was renamed the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI) in October 1998 and saw its domestic internal security functions separated to form the national police force in 1999.
In 1999, the representation of the TNI in the House of Representatives (DPR) was further slashed to 38 seats, with the eventual goal of total separation. The share of TNI representation in the provincial legislatures was also reduced from 20 to 10 per cent.
Moreover, during the 1999 general election, the TNI demonstrated its neutrality by refraining from endorsing Golkar.
SO MUCH FOR MYANMAR’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
In their attempt to mimic the Indonesian model of democratic transition, the Myanmar military has demonstrated an intent to transfer power but has consistently stopped short of doing so.
FILE PHOTO: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar's commander-in-chief, shakes hands with National League for Democracy (NLD) party leader Aung San Suu Kyi before their meeting in Hlaing's office at Naypyitaw December 2, 2015. REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun/File Photo/File Photo
The military adopted the 2008 constitution, guaranteeing a transition to quasi-civilian rule and for bodies elected by Myanmar’s bicameral legislature to take over in the final stage. But this 2008 timeline was already a delay from then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt’s announcement of a seven-step roadmap to democracy in 2003.
The military also subsequently crafted electoral laws prohibiting anyone convicted from joining a political party, requiring the National League for Democracy (NLD) to expel its leader Aung San Suu Kyi in order to participate, which forced the party and its allies to boycott the 2010 election.
Although it was a huge win for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) supported by the military, Myanmar came under heavy criticism by the international community.
The military reluctantly reached an agreement with the NLD, allowing it to contest in the 2012 by-election, which saw Western democracies lift sanctions and establish diplomatic relations. This boosted the country’s economy and infrastructure projects, which suffered neglect in the decades before.
The military ruled the country with absolute authority for almost five decades (1962 to 2010), and another five years (2011 to 2015). Perhaps underestimating Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity, it thought it could win the 2020 election but was proven wrong.
Perhaps underestimating Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity, it thought it could win the 2020 election with help from other aligned parties or at least secure a greater margin of victory compared to the 2015 election but was proven wrong.
A coup was launched after baseless claims of electoral irregularities. Flimsy charges have been filed against Aung San Suu Kyi and her allies, while NLD leaders have had to go into hiding.
MYANMAR’S MILITARY NEVER INTENDED TO GIVE UP POWER
Despite its attempt to follow the Indonesian model, the Myanmar military did not pursue the path laid out by Indonesia's democratic transition. At the heart of it, the Tatmadaw is not ready to give up power.
It’s not hard to see why. Last year, the NLD introduced a legislation proposing a gradual reduction of the military’s share of seats in the national parliament, state legislature and regional legislature from the present 25 per cent to 15 per cent after the 2020 election, 10 per cent after 2025 election, and 5 per cent after 2030 election.
People wearing protective gear line up to vote at a polling station during the general election in Taungup, Rakhine State, Myanmar on Nov 8, 2020. (Photo: Reuters/Stringer)
The NLD also proposed lowering the requirement for constitutional amendments to have more than 75 per cent of parliamentary votes to “two-thirds of elected representatives” which excludes military appointees.
The military rejected these proposals, justifying its response on the basis that the country faced threats to its national sovereignty, the rule of law and stability.
After the NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2020 polls, the military also perhaps harbours fears of repercussions for human rights violations and the Rohingya crisis once more power is handed over to the NLD.
Then again, it might truly think it is the only national institution that can hold the country together.
Whatever it is, it looks like this stop-go relationship with democratic transition in Myanmar may be the country’s reality for a while.
Dr Nehginpao Kipgen is a Political Scientist, Associate Professor and Executive Director at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University. He is the author of three books on Myanmar, including Democratization Of Myanmar.
MANILA - China is easing border restrictions to allow travellers from the Philippines, Indonesia and elsewhere outside South-east Asia in again - provided they have taken Chinese-made Covid-19 vaccines.
"This has nothing to do with recognition of Chinese vaccines," Mr Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told reporters on Tuesday (March 16).
He said the new rules for foreigners who had been inoculated with any of the four China-produced vaccines "is based on the full consideration of these vaccines' medical safety and effectiveness".
Chinese embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, the United States, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Italy have issued notices saying China will open visa applications for those who have had the China-made jabs at least 14 days before applying for a visa.
This will apply from this week to those visiting the Chinese mainland for work resumption, business or for "humanitarian needs", such as reuniting with their kin.
Those arriving in China still face a quarantine of up to three weeks.
Mr Richard Heydarian, a Manila-based political analyst and author, said: "China is really upping its game and trying to make sure more and more countries will be dependent on its vaccines, even though their effectiveness, prices and overall pedigree are far more questionable than for the other available vaccines.
"This is the next phase of its vaccine diplomacy, which has so far been a big flop in places like the Philippines," said .
China has struggled to gain international trust for its vaccines, hindered by a lack of transparency on test results. Still, this easing of travel access to China has been well-received in nations that have to rely on China's vaccines to shore up their inoculation drives.
"This is good news," said Mr Carlito Galvez, the Philippines' "vaccine czar". But the Philippines could not yet reciprocate and lift travel restrictions for those coming from China, even if they had already been vaccinated, he added.
Mr Tjoe Sugiharto, secretary-general of the China committee at the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, described China's new travel rule as a "positive development".
He said trade between China and Indonesia had shrunk because of travel restrictions. "Hopefully, the trade can rebound and return to normal," he said.
Both the Philippines and Indonesia are relying on large shipments of vaccines made by China's Sinovac and Sinopharm to keep their vaccination programmes rolling.
The Philippines received some 600,000 doses from Sinovac last month. It expects to get more than 20 million doses by the end of the year. It is also set to grant emergency-use authorisation to Sinopharm's vaccine.
Indonesia kicked off its massive vaccination drive in January, with a target of inoculating 181.5 million people within 15 months. Sinovac is supplying the bulk of the doses. Indonesia is also securing jabs from Sinopharm.
Malaysia is not as dependent on China's vaccines. It has ordered Sinovac doses for just 18 per cent of its population. Yet, China's "vaccine diplomacy" seems to be having some positive effect there.
Housewife Chung Su Lian, 55, said: "I don't have any plans to travel to China in the near future, but I was hoping to get the Sinovac vaccine because it uses a proven technique of deriving vaccines."
But she added: "Malaysians can't choose which vaccine we get, and we can't buy them either."
SINGAPORE - Singaporeans and permanent residents under "exceptional circumstances" will now be allowed to appeal for early vaccination against Covid-19, the Ministry of Health (MOH) said in a press release on Tuesday (March 16).
MOH will consider the appeals of those who have an urgent need to travel overseas for formal education or to move overseas for work, or to travel to visit or care for a critically ill immediate family member, or for their own medical treatment if it cannot be accessed in Singapore.
"We have received appeals from members of the public who wish to receive their vaccination early for a variety of personal reasons," said the ministry.
"While our focus has been to vaccinate identified priority groups on public health considerations, as more vaccine supplies arrive, we will consider allowing Singapore citizens and permanent residents with very exceptional circumstances to receive their vaccination earlier," it added.
Those who plan to appeal should make sure that they will be in Singapore for the time it takes to complete the course of vaccination - which means applying at least eight weeks before their planned departure date.
For the currently available vaccines, two doses are required three to four weeks apart. The vaccines take a further two weeks after the second dose to become fully effective, said MOH.
Priority will be given to those travelling to higher-risk areas due to limited vaccine supplies, it added.
MOH also said it is working with hospitals and clinics to provide earlier vaccination for patients with complex chronic medical conditions as these patients would be more vulnerable to complications if they were to contract Covid-19.
"For such patients, their doctors will discuss with them whether they are eligible for vaccination, based on their individual circumstances," it added.
The appeal form can be accessed at this website, and successful applicants will be notified via e-mail.
